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Therein lies the dilemma for the world's only superpower: how to cope with an enemy that is physically weak but endowed with a fanatical motivation. Unless the sources of the motivation are diluted, attempts to thwart and eliminate the enemy will be to no avail. Hatred will breed replenishment. The foe can only be eliminated through a sensitive recognition of motives and passions that are not precisely defined but are derived from a shared quest of the militant weak to destroy -at all costs -the object of their resentful zeal. 1 This is a war unlike the United States has ever faced, not one of division-on-division, linear engagements, not one of air strikes against fielded conventional forces, nor one that will one day result in the formal or unconditional surrender of a recognized government or uniformed foe. But, this is a war. A war against an adversary who views his commitment as total, who seems to view no course of action as morally unacceptable and one who has a very clear understanding of his opponent. While most may not consider Osama Bin Laden a military or grand strategist, it is clear that since his declaration of war against the United States in 1996, he has planned and executed a very effective and imaginative strategy against the United States.
In contrast, the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism appears to confront the issue of Jihadist extremism with more conventional tools and mechanisms of statecraft that may or may not effectively deal with the issue. This paper will examine the threat posed by Al Qaeda and associated networks (AQAN), explore the similarity of Bin Laden's strategic thought to other more well known classical military strategists and theorists, provide an assessment of his chances for success if left unchecked, detail the U.S. strategy to counter the threat posed by Jihadist Extremists, and provide an analysis of the United States' chances for strategic success These attacks were conducted by an organization with a unique organizational structure.
One with a tight, hierarchial system at the top, but one characterized by dispersal and decentralized control at its lower levels. But, the question is, "how to get there?" That is the essence of strategy. One could argue that although not a school trained military thinker, Bin Laden is intuitively an exceptional strategist and his strategic thought blends many of the concepts and ideas of current and historical strategists and theorists as described in the following paragraphs.
In, "On War", Carl Von Clausewitz writes that:
As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a remarkable trinity-composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone….The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of the government alone.
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There is no doubt that Bin Laden understands the Clausewitz's concept of center of gravity is another idea that Bin Laden seems to clearly understand. In, "On War", Clausewitz writes:
Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point at which all our energies should be directed. 13 While Clausewitz's definition of the center of gravity is one which U.S. doctrine is based, in Clausewitz's theory, center of gravity prosecution is based on attacking strength with strength. Bin Laden's approach to the United States' center of gravity is more in keeping with the modern maneuverist's approach of attacking a center of gravity via a critical vulnerability.
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication-1 defines a critical vulnerability as," a vulnerability that if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy's ability to resist us." Bin Laden may view our ability to project and engage with overwhelming combat power rapidly anywhere in the world as our center of gravity. Thus, he will look for a complementary critical vulnerability to defeat our center of gravity. The critical vulnerability that Bin Laden has chosen is our public will as outlined in his 1996 "Declaration of Jihad" in which he stated, "…your most disgraceful case was in Somalia…When tens of your soldiers were killed in minor battles and one American pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu, you left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you…the extent of your impotence and weakness became very clear." 14 Bin Laden has rarely taken on U.S. combat forces in large scale pitched battles, preferring to utilize suicide bombers, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDS), and Vehicle
Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) to cause massive casualties to U.S. and coalition forces, effect in the media, and to incur minor risk to his extremist elements. He is well aware of our perceived aversion to casualties and distaste for long term conflict, best summarized by General George C. Marshall when he stated that, "a democracy cannot fight a Seven Years War." 15 Bin Laden is currently controlling the strategic and operational tempo in both Afghanistan and Iraq. By not engaging U.S. forces in large scale combat operations he is able to husband his limited combat power for a long term campaign while causing a "low flow", but steady stream of U.S. casualties, further eroding our will to continue.
He is also very cognizant of the negative effect that brutal repressive tactics have had on the public's perception of a conflict. The actions of the British towards the Boers, the Black and Tans toward the Irish during the Irish Rebellion, and the actions of the French Paras in Algiers were all incidents that negatively affected the public's support of relatively successful military operations. 16 Our alleged excesses at Abu Gharib and at Guantanimo have been leveraged by Bin Laden via the world media to further his cause and have significantly damaged U.S.
credibility around the world.
In summary, while the focus of this section has been on center of gravity analysis and associated critical vulnerabilities Bin Laden's strategy could also be considered a strategy of "Psychological Accumulation" or an "Information Tonnage War" to modify the concept of Captain J.C. Wylie, USN. 17 While Bin Laden may not be having a direct effect on our center of gravity, the psychological cumulative effect of casualties, no clear battlefield successes in a long and drawn out campaign, and alleged excesses against detainees, may ultimately erode our public Awaiting a change in the balance of force-a change often sought and achieved by draining the enemy's force, weakening him by pricks instead of risking blows. The essential condition of such a strategy is that the drain on him should be disproportionately greater than the drain on oneself. The object may be sought by raiding his supplies; by local attacks which annihilate or inflict disproportionate loss on parts of his force; by luring him into unprofitable attacks; by causing an excessively wide distribution of his force; and, no least by, by exhausting his moral and physical energy. The tactics used by Al Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan are very much the pricks vice blows that Liddell Hart describes. These attacks are usually executed against soft non military targets in an effort to lower morale, depict the government as impotent and bleed off coalition casualties. In a strategic sense, the attacks against the Egyptian Red Sea resorts, the London The intent of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, also known as the "ends", is to "stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and our friends and allies around the world and ultimately, to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them". 23 In order to meet this end state, the President envisions acting on four fronts, otherwise known as the four "Ds" strategy. These "4Ds" -defeat, deny, diminish, defend -can be considered the strategic "ways" that the President intends to utilize in the execution of his strategy.
The first front is to defeat terrorist organizations of global reach by simultaneously attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, communications, military support and finance. These attacks are designed to cause second and third order effects, denying them funding, safe haven, leadership and the ability to command and control and plan further operations. The dislocation of these networks will make them vulnerable to regional security elements, supported by the United States government. 24 Under this primary goal, the strategy outlines three subordinate objectives.
The first is to identify terrorists and terrorist organizations. The strategy envisions a partnership between the law enforcement and intelligence community in order to identify terrorists and organizations, map their command and control, and to support infrastructure protection. Collection efforts and assets are to be focused on organizations with global reach, and most importantly, those attempting to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
Information on these groups is to be given the widest distribution through federal, state, and local agencies, as well as international allies.
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The second subordinate objective, closely related to the first, is to locate terrorists and their organizations. The strategy recognizes that the United States Government (USG) is not well postured to collect against terrorist organizations and directs a review and expansion of technical and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) assets arrayed against the target set. The strategy also acknowledges that regional partners are often better postured to collect against these organizations and directs increased cooperation in this endeavor. 26 The third objective is to destroy terrorists and their organizations. This will be undertaken by law enforcement agencies to apprehend and prosecute terrorists, military assets to defeat terrorist networks globally and finally with the cooperation of international partners, to eliminate the sources of terrorist finances. 27 The second front described in the "4D" strategy is to deny terrorist organizations sponsorship, support or sanctuary within other nation states. The strategy envisions States accepting responsibility per United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 and twelve other UN counterterrorism conventions to take action against terrorist organizations operating from that countries sovereign territory. The USG strategy envisions a number of different options in working with other nations and international institutions in the war on terror.
This portion of the strategy is supported by three subordinate strategic objectives.
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The first objective is to end the state sponsorship of terrorism. The U.S. State Dept is the designated lead in this endeavor and is tasked with producing incentives and disincentives for states to forego their support of terrorism. This portion of the strategy outlines a zero tolerance policy for terrorism, sets high standards of state conduct in the terrorism arena, and directs the promulgation of these policy goals through public and diplomatic channels.
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The second subordinate objective related to this portion of the strategy calls for international accountability with regard to combating terrorism. This aspect calls for the use of international institutions and resolutions, specifically, UNSCR 1373 and 12 other international conventions to freeze terrorist financing, prohibit nationals from contributing to terrorist organizations, deny safe haven, and takes steps to prevent the movement of terrorists. 30 States able and willing are envisioned as partners, those willing, but unable, are considered as candidates for support in building the internal institutions and organizations required for the fight. States that are reluctant will be convinced to support the various international counter terrorism initiatives via diplomatic pressure brought to bear by the U.S. and its allies. Finally, states that are unwilling to support the GWOT will be compelled to cease their support of terrorism and any threat they pose will be decisively countered.
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This portion of the strategy also calls for the interdiction and disruption of material support for terrorists, holding states fully accountable for their borders, especially in the areas of WMD proliferation, money laundering, and drug trafficking. 32 Finally, the strategy calls for the USG, in conjunction with regional allies, to root out and destroy terrorist organizations and to establish international standards of behavior and systems to eliminate terrorist refuges. 33 The third front the strategy describes is the U.S. led international effort to diminish the conditions that terrorists seek to exploit. The strategy envisions a significant role for the international community in this arena; therefore the USG wants to keep terrorism at the forefront of the international agenda, in order to leverage commitment from other nations, for the foreseeable future. There are 2 subordinate objectives to this portion of the strategy. 34 The first is to partner with the international community to strengthen weak states and prevent the reemergence of terrorism by expanding bi/multilateral relationships in the promotion of good government, the rule of law, anti-corruption, and economic growth. Additionally, a nation's stand on terrorism will be tied to U.S. foreign aid. The second subordinate objective is to win the war of ideas by working with international partners to de-legitimize terrorism, to support and promote moderate Muslim governments and to work towards a solution of the Israel-Palestine issue. 35 Finally, the fourth front described in the strategy calls for the USG to defend the United States, its citizens, and its interests at home and abroad by protecting the homeland, and Strategy and presents a logical course of action for state on state interaction. However, the strategy does appear exceedingly "state centric" in dealing with a transnational issue, whose foundations are set in Muslim extremist religious beliefs. One theory behind the state centric approach is that the USG utilized strategy and policy experts to craft this strategy whose backgrounds were in Soviet and European studies due to a lack of Middle Eastern experts. Israel, extra-legal measures in regard to detainees at Abu Ghraib, Guantanimo, and elsewhere, and our perceived excessive use of force in military operations in the region, it has been difficult for these initiatives to gain traction.
Whether one supports the idealist, neoconservative agenda of promoting secular, western style democracy in the Middle East or the realist approach of dealing with whomever can best serve the United States' strategic objectives, there are basically three courses of action available to the United States in shaping the political landscape in the Middle East. None of which will be particularly effective, and all of which assume significant risk in attempting to diminish the spread of Jihadist ideology in the Middle East.
Should the United States continue to back friendly, autocratic regimes such as those found in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, we will continue to be perceived as the patron of corrupt, oppressive, Apostate governments and the Jihadist movement will continue to flourish regionally, and within those countries. Should the United States decide to truly push for democratic reform in those same countries, undercutting the power base of those regimes, the United States may be perceived by many as an unreliable ally, further damaging our credibility.
Finally, what if these countries do enact true diplomatic reform that brings groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, or the Muslim Brotherhood to power? Although democratically elected, these governments will not be mirror images of western style democracies. Western style democracy, with its imperative for a separation of church and state, is not a near term viable alternative in the region. Religion is such a cornerstone of Middle Eastern society that it is impossible to separate the state from Islam. In the opinion of Dr Shurifa Zuhur, " If the US continues to promote secularism, in one form or another as the antidote to extremist or revivalist Islam, it will not reach hearts and minds." 39 Middle Eastern democracy will have an Islamic flavor, as secularism is considered to be religiously delinquent. 40 This position is reinforced by F. Gregory
Gauss III, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Vermont and Director of Middle East Studies, who contends that democratic regimes will not drain the swamp for extremist support and that any democratically elected government in the Middle East will probably be Islamist in nature. Gauss contends that the Administration needs to take a long term approach to democratic reform and instead of pushing for near term elections, needs to pursue the development of secular representative organizations and infrastructure that can compete in the long term with Islamist parties. 41 In Lebanon and Palestine, both Hezbollah and Hamas have carved out significant representation in national and local elective bodies that are democratically elected but anti U.S. 42 The "Representative Islamist" scenario puts the USG on the horns of a dilemma, on one hand endorsing democratic reform in the Middle East while with the other attempting to set aside results when groups it seeks to destroy in one portion of the strategy, gain power in a democratic process designed to diminish Jihadist influence in another portion of that same strategy. 43 Given our lack of popularity and credibility in the region, Al Qaeda, should it so desire, may be well positioned to attempt to legitimize itself as a viable political alternative to the autocratic regimes it is attempting to destroy. Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood have all made the transition from terrorist organizations to political entities. Bin The target of our strategy should be neither the nation state, nor necessarily Al Qaeda leadership figures, for the true Jihadist Center of Gravity is the Ummah, or Muslim peoplewithout which extremist organizations cannot operate. The portion of the Ummah we are trying to reach is rarely influenced by the elements of state power, but more often than not by one of two societal relationships, tribalism or clientelism. 44 Tribalism is defined as "the self legitimization of kin group and its intent and endeavor to optimize its collective self interest. Self legitimization is the conviction that the tribe is the beginning and end of loyalty, identity, obligation, purpose, status, honor, past, and future-exclusiveness related to society at large." 45 Unless an individual fully alienates himself from the tribal structure he serves the tribal interest and needs of his kinsmen. If an individual does choose the path of self alienation, the concept of clientelism prevails, where the individual stops acting as a tribesman and unquestionably submits to the authority of preachers or operational leaders. These leaders usually offer the client religious salvation for loyal service within a terrorist or insurgent organization. 46 Thus, the • The Grand Imam of al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo, Sheik Mohamed Sayed Tantawi, widely regarded as one of the most hallowed religious institutions in the Islamic world, has called on the international community to put an end to terrorism in Iraq and to punish Zarqawi and his men for killing civilians.
• In two separate statements, the imprisoned leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group and Islamic al-Jihad, the two largest Jihadist organizations, have also denounced Zarqawi and accused him of attempting to annihilate the Shia vice liberate Iraq.
• In a commentary for al-Jazeera, a leading Islamic activist, Yasir al-Za'atira comments that the very existence of al Qaeda is at stake; the organization's survival depending on whether bin Laden and Zarqawi are prepared to reassess their deeds to be in line with the consensus of the Ummah. operations provided and the good will they generated, isolated the terrorists, significantly enhanced the quality of Human intelligence, turned the majority of the population from supporting extremist organizations, and pushed Abu Sayyaf from the major islands and population centers in the southern Philippines. 53 Another superb example of operations of this type is the "Chinook Diplomacy" being exercised by US forces in Pakistan's earth quake devastated North-West Frontier Province, long a safe haven for Al Qaeda associated extremist elements. In coordination with other elements of the US government and international aid organizations, US forces have flown over 16,000 sorties, carried 6000 passengers and delivered 6,000 tons of aid to the area in addition to establishing two field hospitals on the ground. Once again our actions seem to be gaining converts with young Pakistani children playing with toy CH-47s and a Kashmiri Imam being heckled by his followers for denouncing the US in a recent prayer session. In the words of one Pakistani businessman, "Pakistan is not a nation of ingrates. We know where the help is coming from". 3 Ibid., 221. 4 Ibid., 319-320. 5 Ibid., 380.
